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The foundational contention of this paper is that those Christian
theologians and philosophers who write about theodicy and the issues that
swirl in and around it, tend to follow a common and well-known process
and trajectory that is here designated as the conventional look at theodicy. 
It is a further contention of this paper that, within a community where
belief in God is solidly intact, and where the Bible is already perceived to
be reliable and trustworthy as revelation from God, this conventional
approach may not be the best one to use when dealing with issues of
suffering.  Lastly, this paper will suggest a different way of looking at the
issues of theodicy that will be designated as an unconventional look at the
subject.
The conventional approach to the issues of theodicy tends to unfold
along the following lines.  It begins with a theologian or philosopher
making some statement about the difficult nature of the subject, then to be
followed by an assembly of finely tuned theological and philosophical
arguments designed to resolve the knotty issues.  The intention is to
somehow find a way to resolve the well-known tensions associated with
theodicy by trying to reconcile God’s traditional characteristics of
omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and omniscience with the continuing
occurrence of evil in the world.
A perusal of some current contributors to the theodicy discussion will
help make this point.  Consider Millard Erickson, an evangelical theologian
whose work is often used and cited.  He begins discussion of this subject
by saying “probably the most difficult intellectual challenge to the
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Christian faith is the problem of how there can be evil in the world.  If God
is all-powerful and all-loving, how can evil be present in the world?”1
Erickson goes on to expand on the problem by quoting the words of David
Hume who, speaking of God, said: “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not
able? Then he is impotent.  Is he able, but not willing? Then he is
malevolent.  Is he both able and willing: whence then is evil?”2
John G. Stackhouse, Jr., begins with the same point, though he makes
it more expansive. In an article in Christianity Today, he says that the
problem of evil is“arguably the most important philosophical question of
any era.”3And Ravi Zacharias, perhaps the most notable Christian apologist
of our time who has a very good conventional-style chapter on theodicy in
his wonderful book Jesus Among Other Gods, begins his comments on
suffering and God by saying that “behind this question lies possibly one of
the greatest barriers to belief in God.”4 Any number of other authors and
theologians could be cited who begin the conventional way, noting theodicy
as the thorniest of issues for Christian thinkers.
Having stated their initial premise, those who follow what I am calling
the conventional approach then proceed to engage in sometimes long and
involved theological and philosophical discussions in an attempt to find
some way (hopefully an unassailable one) by which they can either defuse
or redirect the tensions between God’s power, and God’s knowledge, and
the matter of evil so that the conflict either becomes apparent or else moot.
And the usual way of doing this is to either defuse or diminish one or
another of the variables in such a way as to allow an escape from the
problem.  For example, though the proponents of the so-called “Openness
of God” theory would probably not like my characterization of their
position, I think theirs is an attempt to defuse the problems of theodicy by
reducing either God’s omnipotence or His omniscience, depending how
you read them. The result is that expectations of God become only
marginally better than those we have of humans so God gets off the hook
1 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, Second Edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Books, 2008), 436.
2 David Hume, Dialogs Concerning Natural Religion, part 10.
3 John G. Stackhouse, Jr., Christianity Today, June 11, 2001, 74.
4 Ravi Zacharias, Jesus Among Other Gods (Nashville, TN: Word Publishing, 2000),
103.
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because it becomes unreasonable to expect so much of His superior, but
still modest capacities.
Perusal of some other prominent authors reveals this same strategy. 
The already mentioned Ravi Zacharias proceeds by laying out some very
fine philosophical arguments that undermine, even destroy, the critic’s
allegations.  One of his most powerful arguments is that one cannot at the
same time argue that the existence of evil is grounds for denying the
existence of God and then, at the same time argue that there is no
“objective moral basis for (measuring) good and evil,”5 something those
who use the issues of theodicy against God do quite frequently. You can’t
say there is evil but then say there is no standard by which to measure it!
Zacharias follows another interesting line of thought too, that evil may
not be totally bad in its function and consequence, a line of thought that
would also serve to reduce somewhat the power of the issues of theodicy. 
If evil is not really so bad, if it serves some purpose, then the tensions in
theodicy are somewhat diminished.6  This line of argument relies on the
fact that sometimes evil has an uncanny ability to open a window on
goodness as when, in the midst of evil, someone does something
transparently good.  The stark contrast between the two can be very
enlightening. Alternatively, sometimes tragedy has the effect of sharpening
the focus of life as witnessed to recently by Ben Witherington and his wife
upon the unexpected and untimely loss of an adult daughter.  Witherington
put it this way: “Death has a way of convincing us of what matters in life.
It shuts up our squabbles and complaints.”7 The effect of this tragic death
on him and his wife was to sharpen their focus on the things that really
matter in life.
So it is that in the midst of evil, someone might actually find the idea
of a Savior quite attractive as was the recent case of an alcoholic friend of
mine who returned to faith upon the untimely death of his eldest son the
effect of which he described by saying, “When my son died, my own
5 Ibid., 113.
6 Interesting as this line of thought may be, it certainly raises a host of other questions
not the least of which would be the question of the value or outcome of suffering.  Because
of the degree and intensity of some suffering, the learning or benefit would have to be very
good indeed!
7 Ben Witherington, “When a Daughter Dies,” Christianity Today, April 2012, Vol. 56,
No. 4, 36.
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mortality came up and stared me in the face.  I had not drawn a sober breath
in 32 years, and I realized that I was not ready to face eternity!”  The jolt
was enough to return him to the community of believers. From things like
this, some conclude evil has utilitarian value so is not as bad as some would
think, thereby diminishing theodicy’s tensions.
Timothy Keller, the now-famous pastor of the Redeemer Presbyterian
Church in downtown Manhattan, is another who has spoken to issues of
theodicy with good effect.  His line of thought follows the conventional
trajectory. He argues that you cannot, as a non-theist or atheist, take a
feature of life such as one would see in the functioning of the evolutionary
process where one organism or animal preys on another and so survives,
and argue that this is normal and amoral and then turn around and argue
that the very idea of God must be discounted because of the existence of
such carnage in the world.  We cannot deny the existence of God because
of the presence of death and destruction and then turn around and say that
in the natural world, such things are normal and ordinary bearing no moral
implications.8
One more person who should be mentioned is Alvin Plantinga, now
widely regarded as the best Protestant philosopher on the planet.  He has
weighed in on matters of theodicy with a rather prodigious mind mounting
a considerable defense of theism by way of what is now being called the
“Free Will Defense.” This argument is quite long and complicated, but it
has proven to be strong as evidenced by the absence of any serious
refutations even with the passage of thirty or so years.  A summary of this
argument taken from an article by John G. Stackhouse is helpful.  He
distills the argument like this:
God desired to love and be loved by other beings. God created human
beings with this end in view.  To make us capable of such fellowship, God
had to give us the freedom to choose, since love cannot be either
automatic or coerced.  This sort of free will, however, entailed the danger
that we would use it to go our own way in defiance of both God and our
own best interests.
For God to grant human beings free will was to grant us the awful
dignity of making real choices with real consequences.  If God prevents
us from sinning, he is preventing us from truly free action.  And if God
8 Timothy J. Keller, The Reason for God (New York, NY: Dutton), 2008.
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constantly and instantly repairs our mischief, then it is likely that we would
never face our sin and the need for redemption. . . . If God, for some
reason (perhaps known only to God), wants to enjoy the fellowship of
these particular beings (each with particular flaws), then God must let us
be who we are, sin and all.9
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense10 rests on the understanding that love is
the cardinal ethic of reality, and if love is indeed the cardinal ethic, then
freedom to choose must be built into reality as well, for a love that is
programmed or required is not love.  Certainly, if one were to tell a lover
that his beloved was merely programmed to respond, then not only would
the ethos of love be destroyed, but also the possibility of it.  And both the
lover and the beloved would discover their love seriously cheapened,
descending into some kind of self-serving or Pavlovic response.  Love
simply cannot grow or flourish in the face of conscription or requirement.
Plantinga has also pointed out that a lot of the claims levied against God
arise from a misunderstanding of God’s omnipotence.  People commonly
argue that God’s omnipotence enables him to do “anything.”  But,
Plantinga argues, that is not true, for some things God cannot do, like
contradict his own character.  We simply cannot envision God as a being
incongruent with his own inherent characteristics.  At the core of the issue
of theodicy is the expectation of some coherence within the nature of God,
so God’s omnipotence cannot be conceived to allow such a contradiction.
It is precisely because we expect coherence within the nature of God that
we are troubled by the continued presence of evil in the face of an almighty
and loving God. After all, if God were able to contravene His own
character, it would render the whole question of the problem of evil moot
for God would no longer need any defense.  We could just say that God is
capricious, so face the fact that life is tough and get a helmet!
The arguments of Zacharias and Plantinga and others are useful and
helpful. They are engaging and effective. They illustrate the existence of
some healthy links between theology and philosophy and life.  But, as
pointed out at the beginning, their lines of thought follow what in this paper
9 John G. Stackhouse, Jr., “Mind Over Skepticism,” Christianity Today,  June 11, 2001,
74.
10 The shortest version of this argument can be found in Plantinga’s essay God,
Freedom, and Evil, Eerdmans, 1974.
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is called the conventional discussion of theodicy–describe the issues, then
argue a way into and through the issues hoping to resolve the tensions.  
It is right at this point that I make the observation that, for those for
whom issues of God and faith are already quite settled, the conventional
approach to theodicy might not be the best.  One reason is that, if you look
at it closely, it is only scantily biblical.  Noble and enlivening and useful as
the arguments and processes may be, they are primarily philosophical,
logical, or theological in nature, drawing little directly from the narratives
of Scripture.  At the very least, they do not draw their major substance from
any biblical account as much as from the various forms of argumentation. 
This point is not likely to be missed within a community that believes the
Bible to be credible and God to be loving and reliable.
It is in light of this eventuality that the title of this paper emerged, “An
Unconventional Look at Challenges of Theodicy.”  Is there a way to look
at theodicy that draws its thought and conclusion more directly from some
passage (or passages) of Scripture than is seen in the conventional manner? 
Is there an unconventional way to look a theodicy?
In this paper I propose there is another way, one that draws directly on
at least two of the narratives of the Bible, the first the story of Job, long
associated with theodicy, the second the experience of Habakkuk.  We turn
first to Job.
The story of Job is well-known and has long been used as evidence and
a point of discussion by those interested in theodicy so there is no reason
to relate it here in any detail. The gist of the story is that a righteous man
got caught up in the timeless saga of suffering because of things he could
not see, things going on behind the scenes.  For at least part of his suffering
time, Job was an unwitting (and, therefore, grumbling) participant in the
drama.  Particularly poignant in his story is the interchange between
himself and his wife!  When told in traditional context, that interchange is
said to depict the final and dramatic cost of Job’s faithfulness.  It is viewed
as testament to a fierce devotion to God that the man would not surrender
even if his life’s companion scorned him.  There were also his friends (we
do well to use the word “friends” advisedly here), who, to borrow words
from Gardner C. Taylor, came and “stared into his grief for seven days, and
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then spoke too quickly.”11  These words encapsulate a certain wisdom that,
when dealing with suffering, particularly that of others, we ought to be not
so quick to offer explanations lest we say more than we know.  But, rather
than looking at the dimensions of the problem, let us focus on the
resolution to the sufferings of Job as it appears in the story.  How were the
issues troubling Job settled in the narrative?
If the progression of the story may be condensed and paraphrased, as
the discussion (if we can call it that) between the Almighty and Job
progresses, God finally says to Job, “Job, you are such a big and wise man,
why don’t you come out here and face me?  Come and let me ask you some
questions.”  And so Job presents himself before the Almighty and God
begins to ask him a whole array of questions, questions that Job found
himself unable to answer.  In this showdown, according to the words of one
of my predecessors, the score ended up being God 82, Job 0!
Fascinating is the fact that this interchange resulted in the collapse or
evaporation of Job’s wranglings.  In the face of the grandeur and love and
majesty of God, Job’s troubles and questionings simply vanished.  Who can
forget his words, found in Job 42:1-6:
Then Job replied to the LORD: “I know that you can do all things; no plan
of yours can be thwarted.  You asked, ‘Who is this that obscures my
counsel without knowledge?’ Surely I spoke of things I did not
understand, things too wonderful for me to know. You said, ‘Listen now,
and I will speak; I will question you, and you shall answer me.’ My ears
had heard of you, but now my eyes have seen you.  Therefore, I despise
myself and repent in dust and ashes.”12
Before drawing any conclusions from this, let us turn to the experience
of the Prophet Habakkuk for it has some interesting parallels.  The little
book by his name in the Old Testament is remarkable in many ways, but
nothing is more remarkable than the directness with which the human
prophet confronts God!  Even a cursory and initial reading of his writings
11 Transcribed from Gardner C. Taylor’s sermon titled, “Seeing Our Hurts through
God’s Eyes.”
12 Scripture taken from the Holy Bible, New International Version, copyright 1973,
1978, 1984, International Bible Society.  Used by permission of Zondervan Bible Publishers.
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will show that he was not reticent to turn his face heavenward and blurt out
accusations:
How long, LORD, must I call for help, 
but you do not listen? 
Or cry out to you, “Violence!” 
but you do not save? 
3 Why do you make me look at injustice? 
Why do you tolerate wrongdoing? 
Destruction and violence are before me; 
there is strife, and conflict abounds. 
4 Therefore the law is paralyzed, 
and justice never prevails. 
The wicked hem in the righteous, 
so that justice is perverted.13
Clearly, the prophet is angry here. And he lashes out. And God
responds giving an answer that could be summarized thus: “Habakkuk, I am
going to do something.  I am going to send the Babylonians in to over-run
the land and they will put an end to all the injustice!”  Of course, this was
not the answer the prophet was looking for.  It is the equivalent of God
saying to us, “I am going to send in the Communist Chinese to over-run
your land and they will put an end to the injustice!”  So, in consternation,
Habakkuk cries out again to God, perhaps using even stronger language. 
And again, there comes a reply from God at the end of which the prophet’s
troubles were all resolved. And how did resolution come?
The answer begins with a hint found in Chapter 2:20, where,
juxtaposed over against the lampooned capacities of the pagan gods, it is
recorded that, “The LORD is in his holy temple; let all the earth be silent
before him.” There follows chapter 3 which is, arguably, one of the most
magnificent chapters in all the Bible, a chapter where God comes out as a
Warrior, capable of distressing even nature itself.  The language is
magnificent and should probably be read here to make the point, but let it
suffice that the magnificence of God is again revealed in a powerful way.
The effect on the prophet is remarkable.  Habakkuk says:
13 Quoted from the New International Version.
194
THOMAS: CHALLENGE OF THEODICY
16 I heard and my heart pounded, 
my lips quivered at the sound; 
decay crept into my bones, 
and my legs trembled. 
Yet I will wait patiently for the day of calamity 
to come on the nation invading us. 
Then comes a most beautiful confession:
17 Though the fig tree does not bud 
and there are no grapes on the vines, 
though the olive crop fails 
and the fields produce no food, 
though there are no sheep in the pen 
and no cattle in the stalls, 
18 yet I will rejoice in the LORD, 
I will be joyful in God my Savior. 
In an agrarian society, this describes disaster!  Yet the prophet confesses
both trust and joy even in the face of that. 
Let it not escape us that in the cases of both Job and Habakkuk, the
questions that were so very urgent in their minds, got lost in a moment of
worship!  When Job and Habakkuk were able to catch a vision of God in
all his glory and majesty, the questions of theodicy dissolved into
ephemera.  They lost their urgency and simply vanished away.
Some reflection on the experiences of Job and Habakkuk bring some
interesting thoughts to mind.  The first is that the worship of God is a balm
for the human soul, even in times of great trouble.  Perhaps we should say
it is a balm especially in times of great trouble.  It seems that for those who
already trust in God, resolution to the troubles of suffering could be found
by creating or seeking out times of worship.  It may be that believers who
are suffering need not so much careful argumentation as occasions of
worship.  A vision of the majesty and glory and power of God is refreshing
for it corrects for the parallax of circumstance and we realize our troubles
are not the most magnificent things in life.
Secondly, it seems the grandeur and glory of God and their
contemplation, remind us of mystery and the power it has.  I do not use
mystery here as an attempt to evade the problem of theodicy, nor do I use
it in some mystical sense, but rather, I use it in hopes of humbling humans
in their trumped-up capacity for knowing.  So often we think that we can,
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by careful thought and reason, find the answer to all problems.  In truth,
human knowledge is very limited and the process of knowing is very frail. 
We, more often than we think, run into mystery, mystery understood as “a
problem that encroaches upon its own data.”14 It is not hard to run out of
capacity to know. In our experience, the solutions quickly get beyond our
capacity to know and we ought to recognize that.  We are simply too over-
confident about what we think we can actually know.  The problem known
as theodicy certainly participates in this dynamic. 
Lastly, the narratives of Job and Habakkuk reveal that our frustration
with circumstance is no reason to doubt either the power or goodness of
God.  In both cases, God was proven both good and kind, able to act in
behalf of those who trust Him. These narratives leave no room for the
diminution of God’s glory and power.  We may conclude that reducing the
power and majesty of God, or diminishing His love, are not solutions to the
problems that surround theodicy.  They are fallacies of human invention for
in both these narratives, God clearly acts in the defense of His people.  The
path to action may be surprising or it may be circuitous, but there is no
reason to doubt that God is active and active for the best interests of those
who trust in Him.  In this, the goodness and faithfulness of God is seen. 
The conclusion is that calling the goodness of God into question is not a
solution to the struggles of theodicy.
An unconventional way of looking at theodicy, then, is to conclude that
God is great, and God is good, and our sufferings are part of a bigger
picture that we cannot fully analyze or understand.  Our best strategy, then,
is to worship God and trust Him in spite of the things that trouble us. 
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